Long Beach Police Chief Tony Batts managed to grab the local media spotlight twice this week. In both cases, it is unlikely that he will be saving these clips for his resume.

The most talked about appearance was the revelation that Batts had accepted a job to lead the City of Oakland Police Department–an announcement that seemed to take everyone in Long Beach, including Batts, by surprise (due to the early release of the information by Oakland Mayor Ron Dellums).

Earlier in the week, Batts also got a few minutes in the spotlight at the City Council meeting, where he let the Mayor and City Council know that the proposed 2010 city budget, and the threatened cuts contained within, would force a reduction in police presence back to mid-2002 levels.

Batts’ implied that if police officers are forced off the streets through budget cuts, crime rates will return to the much higher 2002 levels.

The problem is, there is no evidence for this warning.

Since 2002, the number of Long Beach police officers has either increased each year or remained flat. According to the police department mantra, this is one of the main reasons crime rates have fallen each year since.

More cops equals less crime. Kind of makes sense. Or does it?

Take a look at the accompanying chart. LBPD sworn officer staffing levels are marked in blue. The other two lines, overlaid and scaled to a base year of 2002, both represent crime rate trends: orange for Long Beach violent crimes, and brown for U.S. national violent crime rates (non-violent crimes rates, both local and national, follow similar trajectories).

Note that both crime rate lines follow nearly identical trajectories downward.

The point of the chart is that crime has been falling nationwide, not just in Long Beach. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, “Since 1994, violent crime rates have declined, reaching the lowest level ever recorded in 2005.” In fact, many criminologists believe that national crime rates actually began their steady decline even before 1994 (albeit with occasional year-to-year and regional fluxes).

Another thing to note on the chart is that in 2004 and 2006 there were increases in sworn police positions. And yet, contrary to the idea of more cops equal less crime, in both years, total violent crime actually went up.

So, is there any scientific merit behind the idea that an increase in police officers produces a parallel reduction in crime?

Surprisingly, very little scientific research has been done on the matter.

One highly respected study, conducted in the early 1970s in Kansas City and financed in great part by the national non-profit Police Foundation, found that reductions in motorized patrols had no effect on crimes rates or the public’s sense of security.

The year-long Kansas City study broke 15 motorized patrol beats into three even groups. One group of five beats got no patrols–only responses to calls for service. A second group received the normal level of patrols and the third group was patrolled by a highly increased number of police vehicles.

After a year, the findings showed that crime did not increase in any of the three groupings. More surprising, members of the public in the study areas reported no notice of the varying levels of coverage or any change in their feeling of security provided by the police.

Keep in mind, however, that the Kansas City study only focused on marked motorized patrols (much like what dominates in Long Beach).

The study’s authors point out though that it would be “a grave mistake” to use the findings as a justification for decreased police levels. What the authors instead concluded was that up to 60 percent of the motorized patrols officers in Kansas City could have been re-allocated to other uses that would be more productive in reducing crime.

A 2002-2003 university study published in the Journal of Law and Economics found that while sharp increases in foot patrols in the central area of Washington, D.C. decreased property crimes by 15 percent, the patrols had no effect on decreasing violent crimes.

Other studies have concluded that highly touted policing tactics, such as community-oriented and problem-oriented policing, also have little impact on crime levels, although the studies do suggest these programs create a better sense of security among community members.

All in all, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that a minor reduction in force would result in an increase in crime.

So, where does this leave us?

Well, it is not within the purvey of Chief Batts, at least based on existing empirical evidence, to imply with any degree of certainty that reductions in force will lead to an increase in overall crime levels.

Plus, keep in mind that the officer reduction levels he is proposing are, for the most part, insignificant in the overall mission of the police department.

When you calculate the number of police department jobs to be cut under Batts’ proposal, both sworn and civilian, and factor in the number of sworn positions Batts wants to civilianize, you see very little reduction in force–especially in the Patrol Bureau, where the rubber-hits-the-road, so to speak.

Now I am assuming that the civilians who will replace certain sworn officers under Batts’ proposal will perform the same functions the sworn officers did (otherwise what would be the point of hiring them).

Given that assumption, here is what Batts’ proposal will cost the city in term of police service:

• Executive Offices — increase of 8 percent to 27 positions.
• Patrol Bureau — decrease of 1.25 percent to 742 positions.
• Investigations Bureau — decrease of 11 percent to 267 positions.
• Support Bureau — decrease of 8.4 percent to 250 positions.
• Administration Bureau — decrease of 6 percent to 126 positions.

So, which way does the scale between loss of police service and a balanced city budget tip?

Well, we have seen that cuts in force don’t necessarily translate to increased crime. We have also seen that the actual loss of officers on the streets would be a minor 1.25 percent decrease (or about 9 positions).

Are these proposed cuts going to turn Long Beach into a cesspool of crime? The evidence says most likely not. On the other hand, will the city’s lack of a balanced budget be the harbinger of even further calamity?

Of that we can all be certain.

What is objectionable is that even though Chief Batts must know exactly what has been presented here, he felt it still needed to be couched in terms of implied warnings.

Certainly it is his job to do the best he can with what he is given, but given the real problems in city management that stem mainly from a lack of cooperation and communication, how was this tact serving the best interest of the public?

A fearful public does not make the current fiscal situation any easier.

Much to his credit, Chief Batts and his staff did come up with a proposal that minimizes the impact to the city—if only his rhetoric had been as carefully crafted.